Dual-Use Export Classifications: Reimagining Emerging Tech Trade for Global Development

Kayden Green

Edited by Jordan Perlman, Eshal Charolia, Mac Kang, and Sahith Mocharla

What do coral reef management and nuclear spyware have in common? According to the U.S. Department of State, the satellites used for both should have the same export controls [1]. From 2016 to 2023, the number of U.S. commercial satellites in orbit jumped from 286 to 4,741––demonstrating the rapid development of the U.S. commercial space industry [2]. As commercial demand accelerates and the U.S. aerospace industry continues to innovate, commercial aerospace equipment is being increasingly equipped with advanced components that can serve both civil and military end uses, otherwise known as dual-use technologies. These devices, such as high-resolution satellites that can be designed to monitor coral reef health or surveil U.S. adversaries’ nuclear endeavors, are classified in the same basket of high-threat non-military 9A515 spacecraft technologies [3]. This joint classification means that technologies containing dual-use components, regardless of their intended civil or military end-use, face the same regulatory burden when applying for export. The current regulatory scheme is largely a product of an ‘input-based’ classification model, where technology controls are assigned based on what the technical components of the item are, rather than an ‘outcome-based’ model where designations are based on the item’s end-use. Because the system relies on a blanket item input classification process, it results in an overly burdensome export application regime that introduces unnecessary regulatory barriers for commercial aerospace. While dual-use designations are critical for protecting military-grade technology from being used for applications that threaten U.S. natural security, altering the dual-use export control system to an outcome-based model would facilitate heightened exports, spread U.S. technological leadership globally, and reduce the regulatory barriers to trade for the growing commercial aerospace industry.

Consider the economic development and diplomatic consequences of U.S. dual-use technology exports to Puerto Rico following the destruction of Hurricane María in 2017. Ninety-six percent of telecommunications cell sites were inoperable and eighty percent of the archipelago’s electric grid required repair, leading to cooperation between U.S. mainland and Puerto Rican private industry, as well as non-profit organizations that aimed to restore essential technologies to the island [4]. Because ground-based satellites were damaged, residents could not call for help during medical emergencies, access their bank accounts to buy food and supplies, or use the internet to apply online for federal disaster assistance [5]. Extensive damage to the island-wide energy grid prompted communities to reimagine resilient energy access. Sunlight and geological mapping satellite data from Google’s Project Sunroof and high-concentration solar cells from the environmental nonprofit Casa Pueblo were deployed to provide individual homes with hurricane-resistant solar panels that supplied stable energy to homes, liberating them from the unreliable island-wide electric grid [6]. For safety and emergency communications, hundreds of Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs) were installed to provide Red Phone Emergency Responder Voice Network access and basic broadband connectivity in rural regions furthest from aid sites [7]. These technologies exported to Puerto Rico were critical in facilitating disaster recovery and spurring economic activity after the hurricane, and continue to aid the archipelago’s long-term resilience against extreme weather. 

The rapid export of these technologies, however, was only made possible in Puerto Rico as its territorial status allows for free-trade with the United States. The telecommunications terminals, civil surveillance data, and solar energy cells deployed in the Hurricane María recovery effort are all typically regulated as dual-use aerospace technologies on the Commerce Control List (CCL) [8]. Commercial aerospace companies seeking to export similar safety-oriented technologies to foreign countries after natural disasters have to undergo the costly, lengthy, and complex export license application process legislated by the CCL and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) due to their dual-use inputs, even when they will be used in near-identical situations to Puerto Rico’s after María [9]. 

All regions and nations other than U.S. territories that a U.S. company selling beyond low-tech commercial goods could seek to sell to are therefore subject to this blanket export control regime regulated by the CCL and ITAR. Such dual-use items that could service military or civil purposes are each assigned an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) based on the technologies inside the product and the product itself, which is then listed on the CCL or ITAR depending on the technology’s degree of risk (intellectual property loss, weaponization against U.S. interests, etc.) [10]. By assigning export controls based on what technology is inside the product rather than the product’s end-use, the U.S. maintains a ‘guilty until proven innocent’ dual-use export control system that discourages humanitarian-oriented technologies from being developed and sold. While export applications conveying that a dual-use item will be used for humanitarian end-uses in low-risk countries are often approved, humanitarian crises do not have the luxury of waiting 40 to 90 days for the Bureau of Industry and Security to process an application, and small businesses do not have the extensive financial, legal, and lobbying capital to expedite their export approvals through [11].

If export control legislation shifted to a less restrictive export control licensing regime for clear and demonstrated civil end-use technologies via an outcome-based model, however, the same companies that provided life-saving technology to Puerto Rico could immediately aid natural disaster relief internationally. Export license applications cost significant time to prepare and process, such as producing documents proving who the end-user is, researching why the tech-input is controlled, and designing export methods that ensure the technology does not come into the possession of an unapproved end user [12]. This delays commercial civil end-use technologies from entering markets while creating capital-intensive barriers to entry that small-to-medium sized commercial aerospace companies often cannot finance, ultimately discouraging them from designing their products for international markets––further restricting these innovations from aiding the populations who would otherwise benefit most. 

This is not to say that the self-imposed curtailment of U.S. exports for dual-use technologies is unimportant. These restrictions ensure the United States’ best innovations remain out of reach for foreign adversarial militaries, serve nonproliferation agendas, and safeguard Silicon Valley’s intellectual property. However, blanket restrictions based on the technology inside a product limits U.S. exports of commercial aerospace designed for civil applications that can enhance safety, global development, and humanitarian agendas. Not only does the current export control regime limit potential gains from trade, it discourages companies with life-saving and quality-of-life improving technologies from designing their products for international markets where they could serve humanitarian end uses. Many of the rapidly emerging small-to-medium sized commercial aerospace companies that do have sufficient capital to undergo the current export application tend to process manufacture civil-use technologies for applications such as weather data, emergency signaling, ocean conditions and geological mapping. Although these products contain military-grade technology that classifies them as dual-use, their software designs and private partnerships oftentimes functionally ensure that the products cannot be repurposed for non-civil activities [13]. This self-imposed technology control that limits the ability of dual-use products to be repurposed could facilitate a lighter screening mechanism for humanitarian technologies if the export control license application shifted to an outcome-based model. 

For example, the CCL specifies that all spacecraft with “remote sensing capabilities beyond NIR (near infrared i.e., SWIR, MWIR, or LWIR)” fall under the Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 9A515 dual-use export controls [14]. Weather observation satellites are increasingly being designed with imaging capable of sensing short-wave infrared (SWIR) wavelengths to provide enhanced views of Earth’s surface that penetrate conditions such as cloud cover, fog, and smoke [15]. However, the same beyond NIR sensing technology is also the primary component in space-based night-vision military surveillance, resulting in both satellites needing to fill out and dedicate resources to the same export application [16]. Naturally, the Bureau of Industry and Security is going to approve significantly more destination countries for the SWIR weather satellites than SWIR military-grade night vision, but the blanket dual-use designation for these technologies imposes the same regulatory burden on companies that export both. Considering the United States strategic priorities—shaping global innovative technology ecosystems, reducing the U.S. trade deficit, and pursuing a “trade over aid” private industry-led development and humanitarian agenda—maintaining the existing export regulatory scheme is holding the United States back from advancing its economic and foreign policy priorities [17] [18].

  Notably, the U.S. government has already recognized that the current regulatory process for dual-use export licenses discourages strategic exports. In October 2024, the State Department waived export license requirements for most civil-use and CCL designated spacecrafts exported to the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia for nearly all dual-use commercial aerospace [19]. Additionally, the State Department reduced export license requirements for U.S. dual-use spacecraft companies seeking to export to forty U.S. allies and partners, including most European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan [20]. 

Because the list is oriented towards existing U.S. allies and partners for military cooperation, it excludes many developing nations where the United States has strategic interest in improving diplomatic relationships. Several of these developing countries are beneficiaries of China’s Belt and Road investment initiative aimed at increasing China’s soft power against the United States, further underscoring the United States’ diminishing influence in the eastern and southern theaters [21]. The dismantling of USAID may cause these nations to further couple with China diplomatically and technologically as the U.S. retreats on past commitments to humanitarian diplomacy in these regions [22]. 

Tweaking existing export control legislation language from the input-based model to an outcome-based one can help solve these challenges. Altering the export control regime to an outcome-based model that accelerates the export of humanitarian technologies could supplement U.S. soft power dynamics abroad by filling the gap left by the dismantling of USAID through the market. To accomplish this, ECCN designations could follow a spectrum of export control restrictions depending on whether the product’s end-use is solely civil or includes military activities. An export license application could then be catered towards the product’s design (data processing, industry-specific voluntary certifications, convertibility, etc) that reduce the regulatory burdens of the current licensing regime. The end-use model replaces the challenge of explaining how the product contains military-grade advanced components with a licensing process that allows businesses to affordably demonstrate that their product’s design prevents it from being deployed for militaristic purposes. A spectrum of export controls depending on the product’s end-use should be used: the lowest controls for products superfluous for militaries (e.g. coral reef management satellites) and higher controls for items potentially valuable but not directly employable to warfighters (e.g. geological mapping surveillance and high-resolution nightvision technology).

Additionally, the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Commerce Country Chart should specify what dual-use civil oriented technologies qualify for this new fasttracked outcome-based export control model [23]. The chart could guide market targeting for businesses by identifying the scope of countries they can design their technologies for and attempt to compete in. The Commerce Country Chart may specify that longstanding ally countries, such as the United Kingdom, have reduced export control requirements for nearly all dual-use products, whereas countries with diplomatic ties to China and regional proximity to the U.S., such as Jamaica, may have additional export controls for civil and potentially militarily applicable end uses (e.g. surveillance). This is particularly beneficial for small-to-medium sized commercial aerospace companies that lack the capital to finance extensive international market research and lobbying, while reinforcing the United States’ commitment to global trade.

While several international trade reforms would reduce regulatory burden for U.S. dual-use businesses, the most effective mode for increasing access to international trade is a wholescale shift from the current input-based regime to outcome-based controls. By evaluating exports based on their end-use, the United States can streamline export licensing for civil and humanitarian applications while maintaining strong safeguards against military misuse. This shift will lower regulatory and financial barriers for small-to-medium sized commercial aerospace companies while accelerating the delivery of life-saving technologies to disaster-stricken and developing regions. Furthermore, the United States’ commercial presence in global markets will expand, bringing with it diplomatic soft power to supplement similar technology-oriented programs that had previously been funded by USAID. This will make exportation more accessible for commercial civil end-use technologies while retaining necessary controls for technology the U.S. government seeks to protect from global actors for IP or national security reasons. Ultimately, an outcome-based export regime would transform dual-use technology from a regulatory liability into a humanitarian asset, ensuring that American innovation can reach vulnerable populations without compromising national security.

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[1] Interactive Commerce Control List | Bureau of Industry and Security, https://media.bis.gov//regulations/ear/interactive-commerce-control-list?category=3&keyword=RTX (last visited Nov. 14, 2025).

[2] Commercial Space Industry Launches a New Phase (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44708 

[3] See 1

[4] FCC Assisted in Hurricane Maria Network Restoration, but a Clarified Disaster Response Role and Enhanced Communication Are Needed, United States Government Accountability Office (April 2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-297.pdf

[5] See 4

[6] The Movement to Power Puerto Rico with the Sun, Google (Jan. 31, 2019), https://blog.google/products/maps/bringing-project-sunroof-solar-data-puerto-rico/.

[7] Becka Badby, The Role of Satellite Technology in Disaster Relief, Ground Control (May 12, 2022), https://www.groundcontrol.com/blog/how-satellite-technology-can-help-first-responders-with-disaster-relief/.

[8] See 1

[9] Fatma Tanis, Damage from Hurricane Melissa Is Still Blocking Aid to Jamaica’s Residents, NPR, Nov. 6, 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/11/06/nx-s1-5600770/damage-from-hurricane-melissa-is-still-blocking-aid-to-jamaicas-residents.

[10] Understanding ITAR, CCL, and EAR99 Classifications?, University at Buffalo, https://www.buffalo.edu/research/research-services/compliance/export/frequently-asked-questions/what-are-itar-the-ccl-and-ear99-and-how-does-one-figure-out-whic.html

[11] Research Administration and Compliance | UC Berkeley, https://rac.berkeley.edu/ec/licensing.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2025).

[12] https://www.space.commerce.gov/wp-content/uploads/BIS_EXPORT_CONTROL.pdf 

[13]https://sia.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/White-Paper22-U.S.-Leadership-and-Commercial-Space-RF-Sensing-Export-Controls-A-Pressing-Need-for-Guidance.pdf?\

[14] See 1

[15] Using SWIR Technology in Earth Observation, Dragonfly Aerospace (Apr. 4, 2024),

https://dragonflyaerospace.com/using-swir-technology-in-earth-observation/

[16] Military Thermal Cameras, Defense Advancement, https://www.defenseadvancement.com/suppliers/military-thermal-cameras/#:~:text=Military%20thermal%20cameras%20may%20be,Gimballed%20systems

[17] Meteosat Third Generation (MTG) | EUMETSAT, (May 22, 2020), http://www.eumetsat.int/meteosat-third-generation.

[18] 44, Leading Economic Indicators Aerospace Industry, https://www.trade.gov/leading-economic-indicators-aerospace-industry (last visited Nov. 14, 2025).

[19] Part 742 - Control Policy - CCL Based Controls, | Bureau of Industry and Security, https://www.bis.gov/regulations/ear/742.

[20] Commerce Announces Series of Rules to Modernize Space-Related Export Controls, | Bureau of Industry and Security, https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-announces-series-rules-modernize-space-related-export-controls.

[21] See 19

[22]https://www.npr.org/2025/07/01/nx-s1-5451372/usaid-officially-shuts-down-and-merges-remaining-operations-with-state-department 

[23] Interactive Commerce Country Chart | Bureau of Industry and Security, https://media.bis.gov//regulations/ear/interactive-commerce-control-list?category=3&keyword=RTX (last visited Nov. 14, 2025).