Great Power War: Will Separation of Powers Endure?

Kayden Green

Edited by Marissa Ambat, Mac Kang, Roohie Sheikh

Since Donald Trump’s first election in 2016, U.S. foreign policy has centered around maintaining international hegemony through a nationalist strategy of securing power monopolies across critical domains, such as expanding U.S. influence in strategic trade blocs, leading technological innovation, and reinforcing the nation’s defense capacity. Make America Great Again reshaped American foreign policy from one that championed collaboration and the liberal international order into one foundationally concerned with hegemonic pressures reminiscent of the Cold War era. With the last decade having been characterized by Russian and Chinese geopolitical tensions and interstate aggression, U.S. executive administrations have shifted their attention from pursuing asymmetric proxy conflicts to direct economic, global influence, and industrial competition. As state interests globally trend towards conditions for militarized conflict, a reexamination of who holds the reins of war-making authority in the United States is critical to preventing a legal crisis amidst efforts to deter increasingly revisionist Russia and China.

Escalating geopolitical tensions and the threat of war have emerged at the forefront of national security concerns worldwide. In the World Economic Forum’s 2025 Global Risks Report, civil society and government leaders ranked inter and intrastate conflict as the greatest danger facing humanity [1]. Russian President Vladimir Putin shrugged off mass international condemnation of his invasion of Ukraine despite the initiative directly violating international law and norms of state sovereignty [2]. Since the invasion, Russia has increasingly pursued its campaign of sabotage and subversion against European and U.S. critical infrastructures, primarily targeting North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) foreign policy interests [3]. 

Similarly, China has increasingly utilized military and political coercion to make broad sweeping claims over the South China Sea and Taiwan [4] [5]. Following the second Trump administration’s imposition of additional tariffs on all Chinese goods, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs vowed to “fight the U.S. until the end [in a] tariff war, trade war, or any other type of war,” a break from the Chinese Communist Party’s previous claims of a “peaceful rise” to great power status [6] [7]. 

The United States has not been idle amidst Russian and Chinese bids for international power, with Donald Trump expressing desires to annex Greenland and Canada for access to their critical minerals, heighten defense spending across all NATO countries, and creation of a nationwide missile defense system [8] [9] [10]. As each of the world’s great power executive administrations increasingly adopt self-strengthening policies and confront the liberal international order with heightened skepticism, their opposing interests have increased threats of military hostility that suggest the potential for great power war [11].

The rapid evolution of these threats necessitates that the United States must reassess its military and legal strategies to navigate a world where great power war is no longer unthinkable. While the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations could rely on judicial precedent for asymmetric conflicts that were negotiated early and proved easier to secure Congressional authorizations for, direct military mobilization between two great powers has not occurred since 1945 [12]. If relations with Russia or China necessitate military conflict, the Executive and Legislative branches will need to unite under a singular interpretation of their shared war powers to justify their actions and convey domestic resolve [13]. Federal advisors are treading unprecedented waters; the evolution of warfare, the rise of new great powers, and the extensive history of diplomacy and rivalry between Russia, China, and the U.S. creates an entirely new strategic environment that cannot simply be legally navigated on 80 year old precedents from World War II. As a result, a reexamination of the balance of power within the branches of the U.S. federal government regarding wartime activities is essential before conflict preempts necessary interbranch policy consensus, potentially functioning as the critical difference between securing or sacrificing the U.S.’s international power position.

The United States Constitution bestows Congress the power to fund and declare war, while the President has the Commander-in-Chief power to direct military forces for hostilities [14]. The United States Congress has not declared war since 1942, yet the president has engaged in numerous military operations authorized and funded by Congress without a formal declaration of war, including the Persian Gulf War, the War in Afghanistan, and the War in Iraq [15]. Such operations are generally justified and analyzed with respect to the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which was passed to address congressional concerns that the president could act with a degree of authority over commencing hostilities that effectively eroded much of Congress’s war capacity [16]. 

The War Powers Resolution outlines three circumstances where the President has the authority to commit U.S. troops into situations of imminent hostilities: a declaration of war, a specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack on the U.S., its armed forces, or its territories and possessions [17]. If U.S. armed forces are mobilized in the absence of a declaration of war, the President must notify Congress within 48 hours of the Executive order for military action of the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the military involvement along with the constitutional and legal authority cited to justify the mobilization [18]. Following 60 days from when the report to Congress is submitted, the President must terminate the use of U.S. armed forces outlined in the report unless Congress has ex-facto declared war, permitted the use of force in a statutory authorization, extended the 60 day period, or is unable to meet due to an attack on the U.S. [19]. This means that even if the Executive military operation is permissible under the War Powers Resolution to respond to national emergencies, Congress still holds long-run war-making authority, in theory ensuring separation of powers while limiting Presidential discretion. 

In asymmetric conflicts with low-level military and financial commitments from the United States, these guidelines are rather permissive, which have allowed presidents to justify involvement in the Middle East under the rationale of “stopping the reemergence of safe havens that enable terrorists to threaten the United States and its interests,” supporting the central governments of sovereign states, and “creating conditions to support a political process to achieve lasting peace” [20]. The 2001 and 2002 Authorizations of Military Force, which permit broad U.S. military intervention against international terrorism, have been utilized for every major U.S. troop mobilization since their passage [21] [22]. Asymmetric conflicts present a lower risk of harm, providing Congress with a greater margin of error that enables them to debate the mobilization internally before officially providing or revoking the Executive’s right to direct U.S. troops into hostilities. In the context of a great power war with Russia or China, the Federal government and citizens will not tolerate such a high risk threshold due to the elevated security concerns of Russian and Chinese capabilities for mass destruction in a more condensed time frame. While it would seem that Congress’s reservations towards hostilities would increase under the threat of a great power war, the imperativeness of addressing a national security concern of this scale would likely result in Congress making large concessions to the President. Due to the nature of great power conflict risking the everyday aspects of all U.S. persons and industries, Congress will be limited in its ability to stop the Executive from mobilizing armed forces before the developing armed hostilities reach the legal threshold to declare war. This dynamic, in practice, severely undermines Congress’ long-run warmaking authority outlined in the War Powers Resolution, forcing Congress to largely defer to the Executive for war-related activities when near-peer and peer competitor countries are involved.

The great power rivalry of today presents new considerations for the Executive-Congressional war powers relationship. If the initial deployment of U.S. troops by the President resulted in American lives lost or provoked a large-scale military initiative from Russia or China, Congress would face intense public and Executive scrutiny for attempting to back-track the conflict by not authorizing U.S. military action. Historical precedent demonstrates that Congress would inevitably respond to the Executive with military funding and a war authorization to protect U.S. lives and interests put at risk by the initial Executive troop deployment. Driven by Executive pressures and the evolving nature of war-oriented hostilities, this response would occur regardless of whether Congress approved the deployment before the Executive acted. If Congress had been made aware of the Executive military mobilization beforehand and denied it before the Executive acted, however, the hostilities may have been prevented from escalating into a war. Considering the “World War III” nature direct military confrontation with China or Russia would likely entail, the undermining of Congress’s authority to stop the Executive from unilaterally acting presents significantly greater risks for American lives than an asymmetric conflict without a great power as a direct actor would.

The “anticipated nature, scope, and duration disclosure” the President must provide to Congress required by the War Powers Resolution may prove less constraining than the legal justifications necessary for Congressional consent in asymmetric conflicts. As the government attempts to communicate a unified commitment to war as an act of deterrence, Congress may be pressured to accept ambiguous or unlawful Executive claims for militarization, knowing the President commencing hostilities with Russia or China warrants significantly more concern than engagement with countries of lower defense capacity. If Congress and the President are in opposition over how and whether U.S. armed forces should be utilized in a situation, great power adversaries will strategically capitalize on this to make demands that threaten the state but fall short of provoking Congress into a declaration of war. Without subsequent Congressional funding and approval, the President would be constrained by the 60-day limit in the War Powers Resolution, providing enemies of the state additional time to prepare, mobilize, and negotiate agreements with other entities that may participate in the conflict. The extreme disadvantage this would put the United States in, not only strategically but also domestically with the risk of government shutdown, is why Congress may be forced to accept any request for authorizing the mobilization of U.S. armed forces by the Executive. This empowers the Executive to act with greater legal discretion, enabling the President to cite inherent Executive powers such as the duty “to take care that the law be faithfully executed” and war powers derived from upholding and defending state sovereignty that are not explicitly laid out in the Constitution [23] [24]. Congressional approval of a legal justification for Executive war powers that expands the President’s authority over armed forces beyond the Constitution’s war powers clause will set a dangerous precedent that undermines the original intent of the Constitution and the legitimacy of the separation of powers. This type of ruling would enable presidents in future conflicts to claim similar enhanced authority due to the recency of the legal precedent that would be established and significance of great power war, effectively overriding past Supreme Court rulings that uphold that the Executive’s war powers “are only those which are to be derived from the Constitution” [25].

 With heightened discretion over the use of U.S. armed forces, the President would possess considerably more autonomy in deciding which conflicts to engage with and at what level, foundationally undermining the purpose of the War Powers Resolution’s passage into law and bringing Congress back to square one. Distance from history may result in a return of Congressional acceptance of Presidential recklessness, potentially dragging the country into an avoidable, undesired war and evoking domestic fears of authoritarian Presidential behavior and a domestic resentment reminiscent of the Vietnam War era. To understand how and why the President may pursue a broad interpretation of their constitutional war-making powers, an examination of the most recent legal battle over Executive authority during great power war is warranted.

   The act of subverting initial Congressional approval has been legally cited and justified by nearly every administration since President Truman, whose actions during the Cold War serve as the primary precedent for the intersection of Executive and Legislative war powers during great power war [26]. Many of the legal claims to Executive war authority prior to the creation of the War Powers Resolution stemmed from ideas of national preservation under international law and the Monroe Doctrine [27]. These legal claims permitted U.S. military intervention for the purposes of protecting democracy and maintaining the U.S.’s Western sphere of influence [28]. An internal memorandum by The U.S. Department of Justice under Truman reiterated these claims, affirming that “the President… without authorization by Congress, [can] take measures which are technically acts of war in the protection of American rights and interests abroad” [29]. It warns that going beyond the region covered by the Monroe Doctrine would go “considerably beyond existing precedents” if taken without Congressional consent [30]. The memorandum provided the legal basis for the President to claim authority to commit acts of war during great power conflict within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine largely from the justification of inherent Commander-in-Chief authority to use the military for national security [31]. However, unlike the World Wars and Cold War, today’s great power competition does not center around controlling spheres of influence and political philosophies, making the Monroe Doctrine precedent a less applicable legal precedent for Executive actions abroad. This has not stopped more recent Presidents from claiming the same Commander-in-Chief authority by appealing to a broader, more ambiguous interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine to protect American foreign policy interests that the Executive believes are not subject to Congressional approval. President Obama cited inherent Constitutional Commander-in-Chief authority for U.S. hostilities against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, President Biden claimed the same for hostilities against Iran-funded militias in Syria and Iraq, and President Trump used this as his legal justification for the 2020 attack and execution of a top Iranian General [32]. As great power dynamics have shifted, so too have the justifications for unilateral Executive use of war powers. 

While the Monroe Doctrine once served as a key legal foundation for unilateral troop mobilizations, most modern debates on the legal ambiguities in war powers law surround the President’s ability to deploy armed forces during a “national emergency”. Previous administrations have claimed the President’s role encompasses the power of discretion in mobilizing armed forces for the safety of American interests at home and abroad. These legal claims are built upon interpretations of Constitutional context and historical evidence of this being the implied role of the President by some of the nation’s founders [33]. While Presidential claims to Commander-in-Chief authority have permitted Executive military deployments under a submissive Congress, the ambiguous nature of the Constitution’s division of war powers and the role of Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause provides the origins of debate for how the Executive and Congress should act in the case of a national emergency that requires immediate U.S. action [34] [35]. 

The emergency response debate became a reality in 1950 when North Korea launched a surprise invasion on its Southern counterpart [36]. In fear of a larger Communist offensive, the Truman Administration ordered troops “to offer the fullest possible support to the South Korean forces”--- without consulting Congress for over 24 hours [37]. Although Truman’s order was ultimately widely popular with Congress, troop mobilization overseas beyond the scope of the Monroe Doctrine without prior Congressional consent was subject to extensive critique from skeptical legislators and the public [38]. Ultimately, Truman opted to not pursue an ex-facto Congressional authorization of the mobilization on the advice of Congress that it would undermine the President’s legal claim to inherent Constitutional authority, a critical element of Truman’s legal justifications for lower-level troop mobilizations throughout the war [39]. 

This “ask forgiveness not permission policy” was perceived as legally sound at the time, with a memorandum by Truman’s Secretary of State stating that immediate mobilization in Korea was necessary for “the continued existence of the United Nations as an effective international organization” [40]. However, the War Powers Resolution now protects against similar military obligations derived from international treaties and organizations, clarifying that Presidential authority to introduce armed forces is not to be inferred from any provision of law or treaty unless legislation enacting such explicitly authorizes it [41]. Bilateral treaty obligations and multilateral commitments to utilize force outlined in the United Nations and NATO, if not covered by the three instances in the War Powers Resolution, require Congressional approval and cannot be used to justify military operations alone.

The War Powers Resolution attempts to circumscribe legal arguments for implied sources of Executive war authority, such as treaty obligation justifications and arguments for necessity of action to maintain the Monroe Doctrine’s sphere of influence, that were exploited in the name of national security during the Cold War [42] [43]. However, legal loopholes dependent on precedent and broad Presidential discretion over definitions of “the necessity of force” and what constitutes a “national emergency” still pose risks to separation of powers should the U.S. find itself fighting in a great power war again [44]. As the most recent precedent for understanding Presidential authority amidst great power war, assessing whether this legal justification remains viable against contemporary threats from Russia and China is crucial to identifying how Congress and the Executive should exercise their shared war powers in the event of direct hostilities.

While interpretations like Truman’s will now be subject to the War Powers Resolution’s limitations, the necessity of swiftly reacting to war and appearing as a unified government could result in Congress being forced into accepting broad Executive legal justifications that have been legally cited by every Executive administration since 1945. Depending on the nature & scope of the conflict and Congressional interpretations of the strength of legal authorities claimed by the President, the Supreme Court can rule whether an executive military order violates Congress's war authority and the original intent of the Constitution [45]. While such a Supreme Court ruling would set precedent against such an abuse of Executive power, the judges may consider the division of Congress and the President’s war-making authority as un-rulable under the political question doctrine, which states that judicial resolution is improper when the issue is an inherently political, not legal matter [46]. Invoking the political question doctrine here would prevent the Supreme Court from using their power to check the Executive’s constitutional powers. This would likely encourage future Executive administrations to pursue broad war-making authority when precedent is set for the Supreme Court to not invoke their check on constitutional law interpretations by the other branches.

The courts may also defect to not addressing the war powers debate as they do not want to be responsible for placing limitations on national security powers critical to an emergency response and Commander in Chief war duties [47]. The Judicial branch has proven deferential towards ruling on war powers unless absolutely necessary to avoid backlash from the other branches [48]. However, the threat of punitive judicial review is vital to limiting exceptionally broad claims of inherent Presidential authority over military force, with statutory restrictions on unilateral Executive action serving as Congress’s primary safeguard against Executive overreach. Judicial review provides a legal buffer for maintaining robust separation of powers in case strategic concerns necessitate that Congress pass an ex-facto authorization of a Presidential military operation in order to communicate unified domestic resolve. Without judicial review dictating limitations on Presidential war power authority, Congress can only leverage its ability to withhold funding in hopes of creating a roadblock for the Executive’s war agenda [49]. Executive action perceived by Congress as subverting its own war authority could spark an inter-branch war, resulting in ambiguous foreign policy, potentially a government shutdown, and a message of national disunity that great power adversaries can exploit. Therefore, the threat of judicial review must be continuously upheld by the Supreme Court to ensure the Executive collaborates with Congress on their foreign policy agenda and prevent emergency war proceedings from setting destructive precedents for the separation of powers. In a situation where Congress has little option to reject the Executive’s military requests, the Supreme Court can render the Executive’s actions as beyond its constitutional authority, ultimately preventing future Executive war powers overreach while preserving the message of a united Federal government commitment to withstanding foreign threats to the United States. Congress faces the dilemma of providing adequate freedoms within a military authorization for U.S. defense operations while maintaining limited scope to communicate deterrence; a dilemma that encourages the Executive to work around Congress when it believes an “ask forgiveness not permission” strategy of deploying troops before notifying the Legislature will favor the Executive’s interests more than immediately seeking Congressional authorization.

This dilemma and Congressional logic over strategic great power interests was debated in a 2021 Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) in Taiwan to deter China from further border aggression but ultimately failed to pass [50]. As a Senate aide under the Biden administration framed it, “Given the experience of not only the last four years of a reckless president but of the previous 20 years of endless war, the dangers of creating another open-ended war authorization should be obvious” [51]. The open-ended war authorizations referenced include the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs that authorized various large-scale U.S. operations in the Middle East [52] [53]. Despite attempts at repeal and replacement, these AUMFS are still actively funded and have long been abused past their original intent [54]. Decades of extensive and seemingly unnecessarily drawn out U.S. troop deployment in the Middle East has created mass public and Congressional skepticism towards broad claims of Presidential war authority to commit the U.S. to hostilities abroad. As seen during the 2021 Taiwan AUMF debate, fears over a new AUMF creating a Middle East adjacent environment with foreign entities more organized and powerful than terrorist organizations have generated significant Congressional reluctance to authorize new military interventions [55]. This cautious Congressional approach to war reinforces the separation of powers by complicating Executive attempts to expand its war-making authority. If the Executive utilizes the military without the consent of Congress and Congress does not approve, they risk losing popular support and the passage of new legislation by Congress that limits the Executive's war-making power. 

This situation played out after Nixon ordered a bombing campaign in Cambodia during the Vietnam War without seeking Congress, resulting in Congress passing the War Powers Resolution of 1973 [56]. However, Executive claims to war authority like Truman’s in North Korea went unchallenged by Congress and ultimately resulted in U.S. troop deployment that would have been significantly delayed or potentially never approved if Truman sought Congress before acting [57]. Claiming inherent Presidential war powers comes with high political risk, a risk that under known contemporary Congressional apprehension towards military engagement and the consequences of war with Russia or China should encourage the Executive to uphold the Constitution’s bilateral war powers process. Domestic reinforcement of U.S. restraint in foreign affairs creates a hostile environment for Presidential attempts to legally expand their war authority, a characteristic of modern bureaucratic relations that reinforces separation of powers but ultimately contributes to the lengthy process of securing Congressional approval that encourages Executive attempts to avert it. 

The risk of a great power war undermining the U.S. system of separation of powers rests on the actual risk of the U.S. directly confronting Russia or China. While the Constitution serves as the foundation for Congress and the Executive’s respective war authority, legal interpretations are not made in a vacuum and largely depend upon the strategic needs of the country at the time. A violation of East Asian allies’ sovereignty in the South China Sea would undoubtedly unite the federal branches to declare war on China, but murkier U.S-China opposed strategic interests like the continuous Chinese encroachment on Taiwan whom the U.S. recognizes as part of China under the U.S. One China Policy would likely result in Congressional apprehension towards committing to great power hostilities across the Pacific, as is evidenced by the 2021 Taiwan AUMF [58] [59]. 

Similar to Truman’s citation of NATO obligations to uphold the Monroe Doctrine’s spheres of influence without Congressional approval upheld by the Judicial, military obligations concerning the scope and legitimacy of NATO alliances could begin a great power war [60]. If Russia successfully annexes Ukrainian territory, China may be emboldened to challenge the sovereignty of Taiwan and freedom of the seas in the South China Sea. Both possibilities could encourage the President to begin military hostilities without Congressional approval, and considering the massive risk great power war poses to the nation, would likely force Congress into accepting Executive demands for funding. Legal justifications for power are the product of the institutions that create them, resulting in interpretations made relative to each branch’s interests over Constitutional integrity. Considering the potential for war with Russia or China to set a dangerous precedent, Congress and the Executive must begin collaborating more thoroughly today on how to legally address great power war to avoid an inter-branch Judicial battle if great power war bargaining becomes imminent. 

To prevent the need for retroactive judicial review to preserve Congress’s war authority, the best solution for dealing with abuse of the war powers legislation is to encourage direct inter-branch commitment to securing Congressional approval before armed forces are utilized. Through regular debates and committee discussions, both branches will be properly educated on the nature and scope of great power threats, with this united interpretation of the conflict encouraging a working relationship between the branches on war powers issues. Internal debates over war authority will uphold the strategic ambiguity that has prevented the courts from ruling in favor of more explicit war powers legislation by keeping debates over legal justifications for foreign policy actions internal yet collectively agreed upon. If the great power confrontation becomes a more likely reality, Congress should prioritize a swift authorization of a specific and limited AUMF directly related to the strategic concern needing to be addressed.

 For example, if Russia successfully annexes Ukraine and attempts to violate the sovereignty of its NATO neighbors, a specific Congressional authorization could be passed warning Russia and the international community that U.S. troops will mobilize to protect those states’ sovereignty if Russian troops station themselves on their borders. Such an authorization would signal U.S. commitment to NATO allies, uphold treaty obligations, and deter Russia from pursuing a direct invasion while remaining limited enough in scope to prevent the Executive from provoking a costly war in Eastern Europe. A sunset date on the authorization to check its scope and use before renewal should also be included, which will mitigate Congressional apprehension of extended AUMF abuse. Congress could also limit the AUMF to a particular presidential administration if it is concerned about how it will be utilized under an Executive with different foreign policy objectives. AUMFs should only be passed if absolutely necessary in the event of heightened risk of confrontation, although AUMF proposals in early stages of great power competition similar to the 2021 Taiwan AUMF could be strategic in communicating national interests to great powers, even if they fail to become legislation in the short run [61]. 

By approving specific instances for the use of armed forces through a limited and time constrained AUMF, Congress maintains its ability to conduct a thorough debate over the extent of their approval for military use and ensures the President is aware of the limitations on their ability to conduct such operations. The publicity from these debates communicates to citizens the limitations of the President’s actions, increasing the electoral consequences for them and their party if they violate Congress’s directive. When great power conflict is limited to competition through spheres of influence, economic power, and ideological imposition, as it is today, war power legal interpretations should be confined to Capitol debates to reach an understanding of the legal justification necessary to prevent inter-branch dissent over war authority. If war becomes an impending possibility, a swift opinion on Executive war power should be published through a limited Congressional authorization that imposes restrictions on Presidential actions as permitted in the War Powers Resolution and Constitution. This process guarantees the separation of powers by imposing harsh consequences on the Executive if they proceed with commencing hostilities under other claims to war authority like prerogative, treaty obligations, and national self-defense that violate the authorization provided by Congress [62]. Congressional preparation and collaboration with the Executive branch will signal national resolve and protect Congress from being pressured into an ex-facto authorization that diminishes their war authority, a risk preventable by judicial review but certainly not guaranteed. Inter-branch collaboration reduces incentives for authoritarian claims to military authority by the Executive while strengthening the legitimacy of checks and balances. Application of these measures safeguards the constitutional pillars of American democracy is essential to communicating signals of national resolve against aggressive foreign nationals counting on exploiting inter-branch tensions.

Will Executive overreach in war powers cause history to repeat itself? The foreign policy discussions of today will serve as a critical juncture for the future of separation of powers and the legitimacy of Executive war authority. While the legal gray area of war powers serves as strategic ambiguity for international war bargaining, these same loopholes present the opportunity for the Executive to abuse its Constitutional directive to “establish justice and ensure domestic tranquility whilst providing for the common defense” [63]. The best possible outcome rests on the Executive and Congress committing themselves to bipartisan collaboration and unity, demonstrating that these powers are amalgamated in the interest of preventing great power war itself. Legal discussions surrounding the capabilities and course of action of the President and Congress during great power conflict, even if short of a formal declaration of war, need to be addressed before it is too late for these debates to take place and war is thrust upon the United States. Executive overreach in war powers will result in a dangerous precedent, damaging the legitimacy and functionality of the separation of powers and spawning a preventable domestic legal crisis amidst what would undoubtedly be the largest national security threat in decades. America’s future rests upon a unified federal commitment to upholding the original intent and integrity of the Constitutional separation of war powers. Through inter-branch collaboration on war powers interpretations and with a joint plan for legal justifications regarding war authority and limited AUMFS, the U.S. is best prepared to navigate the new world order characterized by Russian and Chinese attempts to shift the international distribution of power. The democratic process and values of concerted national resolve must be championed by an America that seeks to reaffirm its status as the global hegemon amidst bids for a revised great power order. A strongly resolved government is the greatest deterrent, and under inter-branch collaboration aimed at specific and targeted military authorizations, America will be best prepared to tackle great power bids for power.

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[1] Global Risks Report 2025, (2025), https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2025/.

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[6] Amy Hawkins, China vows it will “fight to the end” with us in trade war – or any other war The Guardian (2025), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/06/china-donald-trump-us-tariffs-trade-war (last visited Mar 23, 2025). 

[7] Xuewu Gu, China's Choice for “Peaceful Rise”: The Emergence of Realistic Nationalism and Its Implications for the Taiwan Issue (2005), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/projekt_papiere/Gu2005_ChinaPeacefulRise_ks.pdf.

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[11] Thomas F Lynch, The Future of Great Power Competition Institute National Security Studies (2024), https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/Lynch_CH%2024%20-%20Future%20of%20GPC%20(Aug24).pdf (last visited Mar 23, 2025). 

[12] The Cold War | JFK Library, (2021), https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-cold-war 

[13] War Powers and the Return of Major Power Conflict | The University of Chicago Legal Forum, https://legal-forum.uchicago.edu/print-archive/war-powers-and-return-major-power-conflict

[14] War Powers, LII / Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/war_powers

[15] U.S. Periods of War and Dates of Recent Conflicts, (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21405/28.

[16] Clement Zablocki, H.J.Res.542 - Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President., (1973), https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-congress/house-joint-resolution/542/text.

[17] See 16

[18] See 16

[19] Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations, (2017), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Report-to-Congress-on-legal-and-policy-frameworks-guiding-use-of-military-force-.pdf.

[20] H.J.Res.114 — 107th Congress (2001-2002), (2002), https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-joint-resolution/114#:~:text=%2F11%2F2002.

[21] Public Law 107–40 107th Congress, (2001), https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf.

[22] ArtI.S8.C11.1.1 Overview of Congressional War Powers, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C11-1/ALDE_00013587/.

[23] ArtII.S3.3.1 Overview of Take Care Clause, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S3-3-1/ALDE_00001160/.

[24] See 22

[25] See 22

[26] See 13

[27] See 13

[28] Robert Dixon, The Power of the President to Send American Troops to Palestine (1973), https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2022/10/14/la_19480407_the_power_of_the_president_to_send_american_troops_to_palestine.pdf.

[29] See 28

[30] See 28

[31] See 13

[32] Katherine Yon Ebright, Curb the president’s war powers to prevent future Iraqs Brennan Center for Justice (2025), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/curb-presidents-war-powers-prevent-future-iraqs (last visited Mar 23, 2025). 

[33] See 13

[34] See 22

[35] Overview of necessary and proper clause | congress.gov | Library of Congress, United States of America, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C18-1/ALDE_00001242/ (last visited Mar 24, 2025). 

[36] Korean War | Eisenhower Presidential Library, https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/korean-war#:~:text=After%20five%20years%20of%20simmering,from%20the%20non%2Dcommunist%20Republic 

[37] See 13

[38] See 13

[39] See 13

[40] Volume VII Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, (1950), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d481 

[41] Defense Primer: Legal Authorities for the Use of Military Forces, (2024), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10539.

[42] See 16

[43] See 13

[44] See 41

[45] See 13

[46] See 13

[47] See 13

[48] Campbell v. Clinton, (2000), https://casetext.com/case/campbell-v-clinton-8.

[49] See 13

[50] S.332 - Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/332/text.

[51] Jack Detsch, ‘Now You’re in a Situation’: Democrats Pressure Biden on Taiwan, Foreign Policy (Feb. 27, 2025), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/20/biden-taiwan-democrats-congress-china/ (last visited Feb 20, 2025).

[52] See 20

[53] See 21

[54] See 13

[55] See 51

[56] See 16

[57] See 40

[58] South China Sea Arbitration Ruling: What Happened and What’s Next? | U.S.- CHINA | ECONOMIC and SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, https://www.uscc.gov/research/south-china-sea-arbitration-ruling-what-happened-and-whats-next 

[59] Taiwan, United States Department of State, https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/taiwan/ (last visited Feb 20, 2025).

[60] See 13

[61] See 50

[62] See 13

[63] The Preamble to the US Constitution, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/default/files/inline-pdfs/The%20Preamble%20to%20the%20Constitution.pdf.