Life, Liberty, and the Property: Implications of Timbs v. Indiana

Caris Gray

Edited by Keerthi Chalamalasetty, Harper Whittemore, Judge Baskin, and Sahith Mocharla

In May of 2013, Tyson Timbs was charged with two counts of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft. After being sentenced to a year of house arrest, five years of probation, and $1,200 in fines, the state of Indiana sought to forfeit and seize Timbs’ $42,000 Land Rover SUV. Eventually, Timbs v. Indiana was argued in 2018 in front of the United States Supreme Court. The plaintiff, Timbs, had pleaded guilty in Indiana state court to selling heroin to an undercover police officer [1]. At the time of his arrest, the police seized the $42,000 Land Rover SUV on the grounds that it had been used to transport heroin [2]. Timbs argued that the value of the SUV qualified as an excessive fine under the Excessive Fines Clause, and that the cost was over four times the maximum $10,000 monetary fine applicable to him for his charge(s) [3]. The Excessive Fines Clause is a part of the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing citizens the right to be free of extreme fines. A trial court ruled in favor of Timbs, arguing the forfeiture would be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Timbs’ offense [4]. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the decision and, in their ruling, held that the Excess Fines Clause only constrains federal action and not states’ capacities. The case was then brought to the Supreme Court, and, in 2019, the Court unanimously decided the case in Timbs’ favor. The case solidified the Bill of Rights as the overarching law over both federal and state jurisdiction, and created massive implications for the state of law enforcement revenue going forward. Timbs v. Indiana was a historic case remedying the previous wrongs of the Court that allowed excessive fines to be taken in the form of forfeitures, but the lack of clarity in its verbiage regarding ‘what is excessive’ continues to cast uncertainty on the systems reliant on these takings.

According to 18 U.S. Code § 981 Civil forfeiture, law enforcement is allowed to seize “[a]ny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of section 1956, 1957 or 1960 of this title, or any property traceable to such property” [5]. The car, in this case, was used to transport narcotics and was therefore subject to civil forfeiture. While the Court previously held in cases like Everson v. Board (1947) and Wolf v. Colorado (1961) that most protections in the Bill of Rights apply to the states under the 14th Amendment, it had not specifically ruled on the Excessive Fines Clause [6]. Before Timbs, civil forfeiture was considered a permissible recourse for law enforcement, and there were very few attempts to curb the scope or use of it [7]. The Timbs decision challenged the problematic nature of the historical use of civil forfeiture and also reflected changing dynamics between law enforcement and private citizens [8].

Protection against excessive fines (and punishments) has been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history, tracing back to at least 13th century Europe [9]. The Magna Carta guaranteed that “[a] Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his contenement” [10]. The document also required that economic sanctions “be proportioned to the wrong” and “not be so large as to deprive [an offender] of his livelihood” [11]. Looking further to the Commentaries on the Laws of England, a foundation text for legality and legal education in England and the United States, it says that “[n]o man shall have a larger amercement imposed upon him, than his circumstances or personal estate will bear” [12]. These protections translated into the rights of British settlers in North America, and later inspired the creation of the Bill of Rights.

Although the Bill of Rights, which encompasses the first 10 amendments to the Constitution, was originally intended to only apply to the federal government, the Supreme Court eventually ruled that states should also have to abide by most of its rules [13]. To hold this, the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents states from depriving persons of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law” [14]. This amendment makes clear that the states, therefore, are subject to its clauses. Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. government often broke the Excessive Fines Clause following the Civil War. Southern states created Black Codes that subjugated newly free slaves to maintain prewar racial hierarchies [15]. Among these laws were provisions that allowed draconian fines for violating intentionally vague crimes such as “vagrancy” [16]. When the Fourteenth Amendment passed, it had two primary purposes: to guarantee equal rights to all people in all states and to provide the federal government the power to protect these rights should any state try to infringe on them [17].

After the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, however, civil forfeiture became a new mechanism for authorities to impose intense and excessive fines, particularly against people of color. Early in the country’s history, civil forfeiture was restricted to maritime, customs, and war power cases. The mechanism began to apply to violations of criminal statutes regarding alcohol during the Prohibition era and remained this way until the 1980s when it was extended to property used to facilitate a crime [18]. The shift in usage followed increased drug use in impoverished urban communities in the 1970s, where law enforcement became more aggressive in their tactics to combat the rise of drugs and drug-trafficking [19]. This period of policing became known as the War on Drugs, including the implementation of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. This act introduced mandatory minimum sentencing, allowed the trying of 13 year-olds as adults, and created numerous exemptions to the exclusionary rule—all of which led to a massive increase in racial profiling and the mass policing of Black Americans [20].

Following the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, federal forfeitures increased substantially. For example, the amount of revenue deposited into the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund went from $27 million in 1985 to $644 million in 1991—more than a twenty-fold increase [21]. This statistic is only for the federal level and does not even include forfeitures conducted under state law. In 1997 alone, state and local law enforcement reported receiving over $700 million in drug-related asset forfeiture revenue [22]. The system itself places law enforcement in a severe position of self-interest, as they are the ones who often keep the proceeds of civil forfeiture [23]. Forfeitures heavily incentivize both federal and state agencies to participate in a system of seizure that itself has become entangled with crime [24]. Timbs marked a new step taken towards establishing fresh precedent regarding civil forfeiture. Consequently the case addressed the seriously dubious issues caused by the prior lack of legal clarity, attempting to remedy the entanglement of law enforcement with the benefits of the forfeiture itself.

In Timbs, the State of Indiana argued that the Clause does not apply to civil in rem forfeitures (when the legal case is against the property and not the owner) because the Clause’s specific application to such forfeitures is neither fundamental nor deeply rooted [25]. Civil in rem forfeitures happen when property is seized because it was involved in a crime. The argument itself stems from the Fourteenth Amendment, which renders states applicable to the Bill of Rights’ protection as long as it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” [26]. The State of Indiana rejected this notion, arguing that the Excessive Fines Clause fit neither of these criteria. The Court quickly dismissed this argument, citing Austin v. United States (1993), which held that civil in rem forfeitures fall within the Clause’s protection when they are at least partially punitive. 

Moreover, the Court declared that “protection against excessive punitive economic sanctions secured by the Clause is… both ‘fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty’ and ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’” [27]. The Court went further to say that the historical and logical case for incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment was overwhelming, citing the history of the Magna Carta and Black Codes as mentioned above. The Court also cited the decision in United States v. Bajakajian (1998), which explicitly stated that the phrase “nor excessive fines imposed” limits the government’s power to extract payments either in cash or otherwise as “punishment for some offense” [28]. This holding makes it abundantly clear that the State had no ground in their claims maintaining the forfeiture of Timbs’ Land Rover. The Court concluded with the statement that “[t]he protection against excessive fines is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, with deep roots in our history and tradition. The Excessive Fines Clause is therefore incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” [29].

While the judgment in Timbs was unanimous, Justice Neil Gorsuch and Justice Clarence Thomas both left two concurring opinions. Justice Gorsuch joined in the judgment of the Court, but issued a one-paragraph statement clarifying that the “appropriate vehicle” of incorporating the Excessive Takings Clause may be the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause—which is separate from the argument on fundamentals as used by the majority [30]. He clarifies this by acknowledging that the case had not led to an analysis of this part, and that in either respect, the Fourteenth Amendment does require States to respect the freedom enshrined by the Excessive Takings Clause.

Justice Thomas concurred with the judgment, but more explicitly disagreed with the Court’s avenue of reaching the decision. He instead would hold that the Court should not interpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to encompass the Excessive Takings Clause, which he argues has nothing to do with “process.” Instead, he says that the right to be free of excessive fines is one of the privileges of United States citizens that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment [31]. While seemingly similar, Justice Thomas’ opinion would enshrine the Excessive Fines Clause as a fundamental right, as stated in ‘[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” [32]. This differs from the statement used in the Fourteenth Amendment by the majority, which states “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” [33]. The majority holds that the Excessive Takings Clause falls under the protections guaranteed in the prohibition of deprivation of life, liberty, or property, instead of simply enshrining it as a privilege or immunity inseparable from citizenship. 

Regardless of the avenue through which Timbs was decided, the outcome remains the same in that U.S. citizens should now be protected from excessive fines and forfeitures in the eyes of the law. Clarifying the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause to include the jurisdiction of states provides an essential safeguard against severe and unreasonable monetary sanctions and asset seizures [34]. While Timbs held potential to create a more just system between law enforcement and private citizens, the actual effects of the safeguard have not been widely felt in smaller state and local courts due to the Court’s lack of clear standards as to what defines excessiveness [35]. Most importantly, both in Timbs and in United States v. Bajakajian, the Court took “no position on the question whether a person’s income and wealth are relevant considerations in judging the excessiveness of a fine” [36] [37]. Without a definitive ruling, even though excessiveness is, in many cases, dependent on the circumstance, the courts may default to determining excessiveness based on the severity of the crime, rather than the proportional harm of the fine to the person. Excessive fines and forfeitures can be used to retaliate against or chill the speech of political enemies, and have the ability to become a source of revenue for the criminal justice system itself [38]. This is despite the fact that the clause itself was explicitly intended to protect people from the potentially devastating sanctions and forfeitures the government could otherwise impose, particularly in situations that would be disproportionate to the gravity of an offense or would deprive people of their livelihoods—which are, by nature, circumstantial [39]. 

Additionally, paying down fines and fees can be difficult for low-income individuals and families, even if the fine does not initially seem excessive [40]. A 2018 study done on 980 Alabama residents who were paying or had paid of court debt found that 83% gave up necessities like rent, food, and medical bills, 50% had been jailed for failure to pay court debt, 44% used payday loans to cover court debt, and 38% admitted to committing a crime to pay off court debt [41]. By not taking a stance on whether excessiveness is defined circumstantially, the Court has failed to protect millions of low-income individuals who become trapped in cycles of poverty and criminalization due to this court debt. Even in studies done after the Timbs decision, we see the issue persists. A 2023 study found that at least 17 million families with children sacrifice essentials due to court debt [42]. Further, the study found that 32% of respondents reported impacted transportation, the most common being the loss of a driver’s license as a result of being unable to pay their court debt [43]. Moreso, 47% reported being unable to see a doctor, 20% faced negative consequences to their employment, 35% faced challenges in food security, and 27% reported housing hardship [44].

These fees and fines are exacerbated by local governments nationwide being increasingly dependent on these methods as sources of general revenue. When someone cannot immediately pay their court debt, further punitive measures are often taken with the aim of raising more money [45]. Prior to the Timbs decision, local governments would order police officers to “err on the side of seizure” [46]. This incentivized law enforcement to enforce the law in ways most likely to yield the greatest profit for the government, even if it is against the community’s best interest [47]. A survey of 770 law enforcement agencies found that nearly 40% saw forfeiture funds as “necessary” to their budgets, and, in some districts, forfeiture funds amounted to more money than their overall general budgets [48].

A large portion of this reliance stems from the Equitable Sharing Program, which is a federal program established under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 that encompasses the seizure, forfeiture, and disposition of assets that were resulted from, or used to facilitate, federal crimes [49]. One of the supporting benefits, as per the U.S. Justice Department, is to share federal forfeiture proceeds with cooperating state and local law enforcement through equitable sharing [50]. While the U.S. Justice Department website says that the program is designed to supplement, not supplant, forfeiture resources; it has not stopped law enforcement from becoming increasingly reliant on its proceeds. For example, after Michigan passed laws raising the evidentiary standard in state asset forfeiture proceedings, all local police have to do now is involve federal officials, which will entitle them to equitable sharing in the program [51]. The hefty financial incentives offered to law enforcement—especially by the Equitable Sharing Program—has made passing further civil forfeiture reform legislation increasingly difficult. Reform efforts in Texas have faced intense opposition from law enforcement and local prosecutors, and law enforcement lobbying campaigns stifled reform in Missouri [52]. More obvious cases have been documented in Hawaii, where a reform bill passed both houses unanimously but was vetoed by the governor after being lobbied by local prosecutors [53]. 

While lobbying poses a significant barrier to reformation, part of limiting the reach of unjust asset forfeit is removing civil asset forfeiture altogether, or at least part of it. Unlike criminal forfeiture, civil asset forfeiture does not require any criminal conviction—only proof that the property was linked to criminal activity [54]. The practice of civil forfeiture is disproportionately used against lower-income groups and incentivizes aggressive policing [55]. Supplemental policies should include terminating the Equitable Sharing Program, and instead redirecting state forfeiture proceeds to go to community-oriented funds instead [56]. To see tangible benefits across the United States, the Equitable Sharing Program should be completely abolished, or, at the very least, it should prevent law enforcement from circumventing state laws under the program as it currently does. Doing this would sever the chain of financial incentivization, and instead would redirect funds to rehabilitative measures that go directly back into the community. In 2021, Maine already made this legal change as forfeiture proceeds now go into the state’s general fund, effectively removing any direct incentives for law enforcement [57]. Before the change in law, the District of Maine alone (a smaller subset of the state) collected $1,173,954.74 in civil action forfeitures during the 2013 fiscal year, and comparatively, in 2023, the total amount was just $26,439.50 [58] [59]. The data shows, then, that removing direct incentives for law enforcement is directly correlated to less excessive forfeitures.

Furthermore, congress should consider universally requiring local and state governments to provide comprehensive, standardized, and publicly accessible reports on all forfeiture activities. These reports could include information on what was seized, whether the owner was charged or convicted of a crime, the legal basis for the forfeiture, the law enforcement agency involved, how proceeds were spent, and the timeline from seizure to final disposition, all of which ensures accountability and fairness, and also prevents abuses. [60]. In tandem, the process to challenge forfeiture cases could be made more accessible. Currently, a two-track process is used, where property is litigated in civil court while the individual is tried separately in criminal court [61]. Not only does the process itself create confusion, but free counsel is only provided for criminal defendants, not for civil seizure and forfeiture cases [62] [63]. In civil cases, counsel is only available to those who are willing and able to pay for attorneys fees, an expense that is infeasible for many [64]. This is evident by the fact that around 80% of property owners never attempt to recover their assets in court, and when they do not appear in court, they lose their property through default judgment [65]. By making the process for challenging forfeitures simpler and more accessible, the system no longer relies on citizens not pursuing justice.

Instead of continuing to enact punitive measures against those unwilling to pay, the criminal justice system should move towards these rehabilitation-focused measures. Enforcing hefty fines to individuals within the system creates cycles of crime and incarceration, both of which exacerbate cyclical poverty. By abolishing the Equitable Sharing Program, redirecting funds to public programs, requiring detailed reports, and simplifying access to challenge forfeiture cases, the U.S. can move towards a future where forfeiture is no longer an exploitative measure used by law enforcement to secure their own funding. While the Timbs decision was a fundamental first step in moving towards such a less exploitative system, there still exists a necessity to combat excessiveness in relation to the individual—something that the Court has explicitly failed to do despite being presented the opportunity to do so.

---

[1] Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019).

[2] See [1]

[3]. See [1]

[4] See [1]

[5] 18 U.S.C. § 981. Civil forfeiture

[6] Brief for Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019).

[7] Lorenzo Thomas Garcia, Timbs v. Indiana: A New Precedent on Civil Forfeiture, Columbia Undergraduate Law Review (Jan. 27, 2020),

https://www.culawreview.org/journal/timbs-v-indiana-a-new-precedent-on-civil-forfeiture

[8] See [7]

[9] See [1]

[10] See [1]

[11] See [1]

[12] See [1]

[13] LDF Thurgood Marshall Institute, Timbs v. Indiana, Legal Defense and Education Fund, https://tminstituteldf.org/timbs-v-indiana/

[14] See [13]

[15] See [13]

[16] See [1]

[17]. See [13]

[18] See [7]

[19] See [7]

[20] Nkechi Taifa, Race, Mass Incarceration, and the Disastrous War on Drugs, Brennan Center for Justice (May 10, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/race-mass-incarceration-and-disastrous-war-drugs

[21] Kyla Dunn, Reining in Forfeiture: Common Sense Reform in the War on Drugs, Frontline, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/forfeiture.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2025).

[22] See [21].

[23] See [7].

[24] See [7].

[25] See [1]

[26] See [1]

[27] See [1]

[28] See [1]

[29] See [1]

[30] See [1]

[31] See [1]

[32] U.S. Const. amend. XIV

[33] See [32]. 

[34] ACLU, Timbs v. Indiana, ACLU (Sep. 19, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/cases/timbs-v-indiana

[35] See [1]

[36] Gary Charles & Layal Bou Harfouch, How Civil Forfeiture Targets Everday Americans, Not Kingpins, Reason Foundation (Apr. 28, 2025) https://reason.org/commentary/how-civil-forfeiture-targets-everyday-americans-not-kingpins/ 

[37] United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).

[38] Harvard Law Review, Comment on Timbs v. Indiana, Harv. L. Rev. 133 (2019).

[39] See [34].

[40] NCSL, Assessing Fines and Fees in the Criminal Justice System, NCSL (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/civil-and-criminal-justice/assessing-fines-and-fees-in-the-criminal-justice-system#:~:text=Some%20believe%20that%20people%20convicted,to%20states%20and%20local%20governments

[41] See [40].

[42] Jessey Neves, 1 in 3 Americans Directly Impacted by Legal Fees/Fines According to First-of-its-Kind National Survey, Fines and Fees Justice Center (May 24, 2023), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/2023/05/24/press-release-1-in-3-americans-directly-impacted-by-legal-fees-fines-according-to-first-of-its-kind-national-survey/

[43] See [42].

[44] See [42].

[45] See [42].

[46]  'Timbs v. Indiana', Legal Information Institute (2018). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/17-1091

[47] See [46].

[48] Currie Myers, The Impact of Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures on Policing, Americans for Prosperity, https://americansforprosperity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/AFP-Sheriff-Ret-Currie-Meyers-White-paper-The-impact-of-fines-fees-and-forfeitures-on-policing.pdf (last viewed  )

[49] U.S. Department of Justice, Equitable Sharing Program, U.S. Department of Justice (Nov 3, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-mnf/equitable-sharing-program

[50] See [49].

[51] Trevor Burrus & Randal John Meyer, Feds Using Forfeiture to their Advantage, CATO Institute (Apr. 3, 2016), https://www.cato.org/commentary/feds-using-forfeiture-their-advantage

[52] Lisa Knepper, Jennifer McDonald, Kathy Sanchez & Elyse Smith Pohl, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture (3d ed. 2020), https://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit-3/pfp3content/barriers-to-forfeiture-reform/ 

[53] See [52].

[54] U.S. Department of Justice, Types of Federal Forfeiture, U.S. Department of Justice (Oct. 11, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federal-forfeiture 

[55] Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, A Legislative Guide for Winnable, High-Impact Criminal Justice Reforms, Prison Policy Initiative (June 10, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/06/10/winnable-reforms/#:~:text=End%20civil%20asset%20forfeiture&text=While%20this%20practice%20is%20supposed,work%20on%20Asset%20Forfeiture%20Reform. 

[56] See [55].

[57] Gary Charles & Layal Bou Harfouch, How Civil Forfeiture Targets Everday Americans, Not Kingpins, Reason Foundation (Apr. 28, 2025) https://reason.org/commentary/how-civil-forfeiture-targets-everyday-americans-not-kingpins/ 

[58] Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Maine, District of Maine U.S. Attorney’s Office Collects Over $2.5 Million in Civil and Criminal Actions for U.S. Taxpayers in Fiscal Year 2013 (Jan. 9, 2014) https://www.justice.gov/usao-me/pr/district-maine-us-attorney-s-office-collects-over-25-million-civil-and-criminal-actions

[59] See [57]

[60] See [57].

[61] See [57].

[62] See [57].

[63] Dan Greenberg, Five Myths of Civil Forfeiture (2d ed. 2023).

https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Five-Forfeiture-Myths-2ndEd-v2.pdf 

[64] See [63].

[65] See [63].